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I.

INTRODUCTION

How should a court divide up fault between two negligent
1
parties? Since its early roots in English common law, this
seemingly simple question has continuously confused juries,
judges, and lawyers alike. The question remains at the heart of
three prominent legal doctrines: (1) reconciliation of inconsistent
special verdicts, (2) primary assumption of risk, and (3) the
application of emergency rule instructions. All three of these
doctrines were at issue in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s recent
2
decision in Daly v. McFarland. As this note will discuss, all three
doctrines serve only to confuse the question of how courts divide
fault between negligent parties. If we are ever to provide a
consistent answer to this question, the application of all three
doctrines in Minnesota must undergo a serious adjustment, if not
an altogether abandonment.
This note begins with a historical look at Minnesota cases that
lay the foundation for the court’s decision in Daly. Then, given this
context, the note examines whether the Daly decision flows
logically from the previous case law. Lastly, it concludes that
although the court generally got the decision right, it missed an
opportunity to bring clarity to an issue that desperately needs it.

1.
2.

Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809) 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.), 11 East 60.
812 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 2012).
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II. HISTORY
Determining whether the Daly decision was right or wrong
depends largely on the historical context of each of the three issues
at play. Therefore, before any analysis of Daly can be made, a
historical background must be built for each of the three issues
involved. Parts A, B, and C of this section examine the origins of
contributory negligence. Parts D and E discuss the origins of
comparative fault. Part F discusses assumption of risk and Part G
discusses the emergency rule.
A.

Establishing a Prima Facie Negligence Claim

Before an examination of its history, it is important to
understand what a claim of negligence actually entails. Intentional
torts involve the intentional harming of a person and thus prohibit
specific acts like intentional touching and intentional
3
confinement. Negligence, on the other hand, cannot be neatly
categorized by a number of specifically forbidden acts. Instead,
negligence entails an actionable harm created by a party’s
4
unreasonably risky conduct. Such a determination cannot be
made by simply listing out all conduct deemed unreasonably risky.
Instead, courts have developed a general formula for a negligence
claim that requires the injured party to establish the following four
factors:
1. The tortfeasor owed the injured party a legal duty.
2. The tortfeasor breached that duty by behaving negligently.
3. The injured party suffered actual damage.
4. The tortfeasor’s negligence was an actual and proximate cause
5
of the damage.
The injured party has the burden of proof in establishing all four
of these elements, and if the injured party fails to meet any one of
6
them, he will not be able to recover.

3. DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL
ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURY 106 (6th ed. 2009).
4. Id. Notably, this definition makes no mention of an intent element,
which is so central to the intentional harms like assault, trespass, false
imprisonment, etc.
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1965); DOBBS ET AL., supra
note 3, at 108.
6. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 108.
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A Brief History of Negligence as an Independent Tort Action

The general formula for establishing a prima facie negligence
claim was not developed in a single landmark decision. Instead, it
is the product of a slow development through common law,
culminating in the ratification of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 281. Negligence-based claims originated in England as the
public began to recognize the benefit of holding certain agents like
7
carriers, innkeepers, and surgeons to a higher public standard.
The arrival of the Industrial Revolution would further spur a
recognition of negligence as a separate and independent basis for
8
tort liability.
Ultimately, the central question surrounding
negligence claims has always involved determining what behavior
counts as causing an unreasonable risk of harm.
C.

Contributory Negligence as an Affirmative Defense

As stated previously, the injured party bears the burden of
proof in establishing the four elements that make up a prima facie
9
case for negligence. If an injured party successfully establishes all
four elements, the claim will survive the summary judgment stage
10
and reach the jury. However, establishing a prima facie case does
not mean the injured party is entitled to recovery. As often is the
case, the injured party may see his recovery reduced or even
dismissed if the tortfeasor can mount a successful affirmative
11
defense.
Notably, the burden of proof shifts from the injured
party to the tortfeasor at this stage. Whereas it previously lay upon
the injured party to establish the four factors of negligence, the
tortfeasor now bears the burden of proof in establishing the
12
existence of an affirmative defense.
Although a number of
13
affirmative defenses exist, the most common is contributory
negligence—in which the tortfeasor asserts that the injured party

7. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 28, at 161 (5th
ed. 1984).
8. Percy H. Winfield, The History of Negligence in the Law of Torts, 42 LAW Q.
REV. 184, 195 (1926).
9. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281.
10. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 251.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Local statutes will often create specific defenses relating to particular
types of cases. In addition, legislatures may establish “partial” affirmative defenses,
such as damage caps. Id.
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himself behaved negligently and thus should see a reduction in
14
Importantly, the tortfeasor is not claiming that the
recovery.
injured party failed to establish one of the four elements of a
negligence claim. Instead, contributory negligence asserts that the
injured party should be denied recovery because his own conduct
15
disentitles him from maintaining the action.
D.

A Brief History of Comparative Fault
1.

The Early Days

In its earliest stages, contributory negligence was viewed as a
16
complete, all-or-nothing defense to an injured party’s claim.
Thus, any finding of contributory negligence at all, no matter how
17
small, would completely bar an injured party from recovery. Such
was the case even when a tortfeasor’s negligence was extreme and
18
the injured party’s negligence was relatively minor. The earliest
forms of contributory negligence were an all-or-nothing game,
where a single drop would poison an injured party’s claim, barring
him from any recovery whatsoever.
A number of justifications have been put forth for this early
conception of contributory negligence. Generally, tort law has
employed two goals associated with its construction: (1) the
compensation of injured parties, and (2) deterring unsafe
19
conduct. The early all-or-nothing view of contributory negligence
clearly serves the latter of these twin goals. Instead of focusing on
the compensation of injuries, early courts seemed more concerned
with punishing a plaintiff’s own negligent behavior in an effort to

14. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 65, at 451 (defining contributory
negligence as “[c]onduct on the part of the plaintiff, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required
to conform for his own protection”). A contributory negligence analysis involves
essentially the exact same four-element analysis, but instead relating to the injured
party’s duty, breach, actual and proximate cause, and damages. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 463 cmt. b.
15. As Prosser elegantly puts it, “In the eyes of the law both parties are at
fault; and the defense is one of the plaintiff’s disability, rather than the
defendant’s innocence.” KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 65, at 452.
16. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 253; see, e.g., Butterfield v. Forrester, (1809)
103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B.), 11 East 60.
17. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 253.
18. So long as the defendant’s negligence did not rise to the level of a
reckless or wanton act. Id.
19. See generally id. at 2–20.
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20

deter future conduct.
With this motivation in mind, courts
conceived that injured parties should come to the courtroom with
“clean hands,” and failure to do so would result in a complete
21
denial of recovery.
Another justification for the all-or-nothing view of contributory
negligence derived from the economic climate of the time. The
industrial sector was undergoing a boom in growth, and the courts
22
made a conscious effort to stay out of its way as much as possible.
23
Coupled with an inherent distrust of plaintiff-minded juries,
courts recognized that industrial growth would be severely
24
hindered if liabilities got out of control. The all-or-nothing view
served as the courts’ way of preventing precedent from being
introduced that might slow industrial growth. Once again, the
emphasis on deterrence rather than compensation was apparent.
Thinking of contributory negligence as an all-or-nothing
defense is an antiquated viewpoint in light of modern tort law. In
addition to the justifications discussed, the courts’ views on
contributory negligence were largely due to an inability to come up
25
with a system for apportioning fault. Unlike today, early courts
thought that a single, indivisible injury must fall solely on the
26
plaintiff or the defendant. Unfortunately, this would often lead to
disproportionately harsh results for injured parties, even when
their own negligence was relatively small and the tortfeasor’s was
27
quite extreme. If negligence is thought of as a deviation from a
20. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 65, at 453 (“With the gradual change in
social viewpoint, such that the compensation of injured persons appears to have
become the dominant goal of accident law, the defense of contributory negligence
has come to be looked upon with increasing disfavor by the courts . . . .”).
21. Id. at 452.
22. See James Fleming Jr., Contributory Negligence, 62 YALE L.J. 691, 695 n.20
(1953); see also Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L.
REV. 151 (1947).
23. Malone, supra note 22, at 158.
24. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 65, at 452 (explaining the reasoning behind
the all-or-nothing approach: “[c]hief among these was . . . a desire to keep the
liabilities of growing industry within some bounds”).
25. Id. at 470.
26. Heil v. Glanding, 42 Pa. 493, 499 (1862) (“The reason why, in cases of
mutual concurring negligence, neither party can maintain an action against the
other, is . . . that the law cannot measure how much the damage suffered is
attributable to the plaintiff’s own fault.”).
27. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 468–69 (“The hardship of the
doctrine of contributory negligence upon the plaintiff is readily apparent. It
places upon one party the entire burden of a loss for which two are, by hypothesis,
responsible.”).
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communal standard of behavior, it makes little sense why a
tortfeasor’s negligence, which was just as much a cause of the injury
28
as plaintiff’s, was given so much more leeway. As shown in the
following section, this is no longer the case.
2.

Contemporary Comparative Fault Systems

The deficiencies of the early all-or-nothing conception of
contributory negligence necessitated a different way of looking at
fault apportionment. Instead of focusing on deterring a potential
29
plaintiff’s negligence, courts began to focus on remedying an
injury in the most just way possible, marking a shift in the twin
goals of tort law. Whereas the focus was previously on deterrence,
contemporary courts now employ fault-apportionment systems that
emphasize compensation.
Instead of playing an all-or-nothing game focused on liability,
the courts shifted their attention to dividing damages between the
30
parties at fault. Although courts were initially reluctant to begin
31
dividing up fault, this type of damage apportionment already
32
existed in many civil law and common law jurisdictions outside of
33
Furthermore, fault apportionment was a
the United States.
common concept in English admiralty law with the adoption of the
34
Brussels Maritime Convention and its provision holding that
damages would be divided “in proportion to the degree in which
35
each vessel was at fault.”
Eventually, comparative fault would
28. Id. at 469.
29. See id. (“[I]t is quite unlikely that forethought of any legal liability will in
fact be in the mind of either party. No one supposes that an automobile driver, as
he approaches an intersection, is in fact meditating upon the golden mean of the
reasonable person of ordinary prudence, and the possibility of tort damages,
whether for himself or for another.” (footnote omitted)); see also Alvis v. Ribar, 421
N.E.2d 886, 893–94 (Ill. 1981).
30. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 470.
31. Id. (discussing the common reasons for the courts’ reluctance, including
judicial inertia, tradition, and a distrust of the unreliability of a jury in
determining the division of damages).
32. HENRY WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT, § 1:9, at 17
(1978) (including Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, Austria, Germany, France,
Philippines, China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and Turkey).
33. England has had a “pure” comparative fault system since 1945. KEETON
ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 470 n.16.
34. See id. at 471 n.17 (citing Maritime Conventions Act, 1911, 1 & 2 Geo. 5,
c. 57, § 1).
35. Id. at 471. Ultimately, American courts would adopt a similar “pure”
comparative fault system in maritime law in the 1975. See United States v. Reliable
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expand into American jurisprudence in the early to mid-twentieth
36
century.
a.

Pure Comparative Fault Systems

As comparative fault was first getting on its feet, the simplest
and most flexible method of dividing damages was the “pure”
comparative fault system. In a pure comparative fault jurisdiction,
damages are reduced in strict proportion with the injured party’s
37
fault. However much the plaintiff was deemed responsible for the
accident would be the exact amount by which his recovery would
be reduced. Thus, once a jury determines the percentage of fault
for each party, apportioning the damages becomes relatively simple
under a pure comparative fault system.
Unfortunately, the pure comparative fault system possesses a
major flaw. Because it bases recovery on pure proportionality, it
can sometimes permit a severely negligent party to recover against
38
a slightly negligent party, solely because the former suffered more
39
severe injuries.
In an effort to avoid this scenario, many
jurisdictions have adopted a modified version of the pure
comparative system.
b.

Modified Comparative Fault
40

The most common means of apportioning fault, the
“modified” comparative fault system is essentially a combination of
the all-or-nothing approach and the “pure” comparative fault
system. As was done in a pure comparative fault system, both
41
plaintiff and defendant are assigned a percentage of fault.
However, if a plaintiff is apportioned over 51% of the fault of the
accident, then he will not recover (echoing the complete bar to

Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 411 (1975).
36. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 471 (pointing out that the first
state to adopt a comparative fault act was Mississippi in 1910).
37. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 254.
38. See VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 21.3, at 344–45
(1974).
39. Such is the case where both parties have suffered injuries due to the
other’s negligence. See Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, 883 (W.
Va. 1979) (illustrating how a less-at-fault party may be forced to pay the more-atfault party under the “pure comparative negligence rule”).
40. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 38, § 3.5, at 73–82.
41. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 254.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol39/iss1/12

8

Cary: Torts: Playing the Blame Game: The Division of Fault between Negl

2012]

DIVISION OF FAULT

283
42

recovery seen in the all-or-nothing system).
If the plaintiff is
apportioned less than 51%, then his damages are simply reduced
proportionally to his fault, just as was done in the pure comparative
43
fault system. In 1969, Minnesota became a modified comparative
fault jurisdiction with the ratification of Minnesota Statute section
44
604.01.
E.

Distinguishing Between Fault and Cause Apportionment
in Minnesota

The previous sections showed the long evolution of
contemporary comparative fault, from the early all-or-nothing
45
method to Minnesota’s adoption of “modified” comparative fault.
Having determined how Minnesota arrived at its current system, it
is important to discuss how that system actually works. In either
contemporary comparative fault system, be it pure or modified, the
most important step is the jury’s actual apportionment of fault—
that is, the step in which they deem the injured party to be one
percentage at fault and the tortfeasor another. Unfortunately, this
all-important step is often clouded in confusion, frequently
resulting in inconsistent jury verdicts.
42. In a number of states, the threshold percentage is 50% instead of 51%.
See, e.g., Moyer Car Rental, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 610 P.2d 232 (Okla. 1980).
This is known as the “equal fault bar” approach because it will completely bar a
plaintiff’s recovery if his fault is equal to (or greater than) the defendant’s. See id.
The distinction is important. Juries will often resort to a 50-50 apportionment of
fault when the case is simply too close to call. If within an “equal fault bar”
jurisdiction, a 50-50 division means that the plaintiff is unable to recover. See id.
However, if the threshold is upped to 51%, the plaintiff will not be completely
barred by a 50-50 apportionment. See id. The following states still use the 50%
threshold: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, North Dakota,
Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 473 n.39.
43. Just as the pure comparative fault system possessed a major drawback, so
too does the modified system. The flaw occurs when a plaintiff is comparing his
negligence to that of multiple defendants. To determine if he is able to recover at
all, the plaintiff compares his fault to each individual (remember, he is completely
barred from recovery if his fault is greater than that of the defendant). Therefore,
defendants are encouraged to join as many parties as possible in order to lower
the percentage of fault for each individual defendant. Some states have tried to
remedy this problem by implementing a “unit rule” which aggregates the
negligence of all the defendants. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 473–74;
see also id. § 67, at 474 n.46 (providing examples of the “unit rule” jurisdictions).
However, Daly does not involve multiple defendants, requiring no further
elaboration.
44. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2012).
45. See supra Part II.A–D.
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The confusion seen in the apportionment step often comes
from not being fully clear on the distinction between cause and
fault. Although it may be subtle, the distinction becomes apparent
by understanding one key notion: a party will never be legally
responsible for an act, no matter how severely negligent, if the act
46
causes no actual harm. In other words, a party will not be liable if
47
there is no direct cause. For example, a person driving 70 miles
per hour through a residential neighborhood, but does not hit
anything, will not be liable for negligence because he was not a
direct cause of any harm. Causation is binary; it either exists or it
48
does not. If it does, and the jury determines that a party was a
direct cause, the jury can then apportion that party the percentage
of fault of the accident. Therefore, it is inconsistent for a jury to
rule a party to not be a direct cause of an accident, and then
apportion that same party a percentage of fault for the accident.
Unfortunately, this distinction is a difficult concept to grasp and
can often lead to inconsistent jury verdicts, much like the one seen
in Daly.
With the 1951 enactment of Rule 49.01 of the Minnesota Rules
of Civil Procedure, Minnesota introduced special verdict forms to
49
jury trials. In negligence cases, special verdict forms are often the
primary way of getting the jury to assign percentages of fault to
50
51
each party. Although it is logically inconsistent to do so, it is an
unfortunate reality that juries will sometimes apportion fault to a
party who they have already determined not to have been a direct
cause of the accident. Evolving from a series of cases responding to
this very scenario, Minnesota courts have developed a two-step
protocol for dealing with inconsistent special verdicts: (1) if
52
possible, the court should reconcile the inconsistent answers; (2)
46. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 107.
47. This is the actual and proximate cause element discussed previously. See
supra Part II.A.
48. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 474.
49. MINN. R. CIV. P. 49.01.
50. Typically this involves a series of interrogatives that initially pertain to
direct cause, followed by a series of interrogatives apportioning percentages of
fault based on the answers to the initial direct cause questions. See Daly v.
McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 124 n.5 (Minn. 2012).
51. See, e.g., infra note 55.
52. Reese v. Henke, 277 Minn. 151, 155, 152 N.W.2d 63, 66 (1967) (“[T]he
verdict is to be liberally construed to give effect to the intention of the jury and to
harmonize answers to interrogatories if it is possible to do so. The test is whether
the answers can be reconciled in any reasonable manner consistent with the
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if reconciliation is not possible, then the court should either have
53
54
the jury deliberate further or issue a new trial.
When faced with an inconsistent special verdict form,
Minnesota courts will first look to reconcile the inconsistent
answers if it is at all possible to do so. Such was the case in Reese v.
55
Henke, in which the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, as a
56
matter of law, it was its duty to reconcile the verdict. In doing so,
the court held that the special jury verdict should be liberally
57
construed in order to maintain the true intent of the jury.
Furthermore, the Reese court held that reconciling special verdict
answers must be done such that a reasonable person could only
58
interpret the inconsistent answers in one way.
The important
takeaway from Reese is that courts will first try to reconcile
inconsistent answers in order to maintain the jury’s intent.
If the inconsistent answers can simply not be reconciled, then
the court will likely either send the jury back for further
59
deliberation or order a new trial. The option to resubmit the case
60
to the jury was established by the 1975 ruling in Peterson v. Haule.
There, the jury returned a special verdict finding that both
defendants were negligent, but neither was a direct cause of the
61
accident.
Despite this determination, the verdict later
evidence and its fair inferences.”).
53. Peterson v. Haule, 304 Minn. 160, 174–75, 230 N.W.2d 51, 60 (1975)
(“[T]he trial judge could either have ordered a new trial or sent the jury back for
further deliberations.”).
54. Meinke v. Lewandowski, 306 Minn. 406, 412, 237 N.W.2d 387, 391 (1975)
(recognizing that ordering a new trial is a legitimate course of action when faced
with inconsistent answers to special verdict interrogatories).
55. 277 Minn. 151, 152, 152 N.W.2d 63, 64--65 (1967). Plaintiff in Reese was a
passenger in a car that was involved in an accident with a truck. Id. Plaintiff sued
the drivers of both vehicles for negligence. Id. The jury returned a special verdict
form indicating that both defendants were negligent, but the driver of the car did
not directly cause the accident. Id. at 155, 152 N.W.2d at 66. The truck driver
argued that this verdict was inconsistent.
56. Id. at 156, 152 N.W.2d at 67.
57. Id. at 155, 152 N.W.2d at 66.
58. Id. Ultimately, the Reese court reconciled the special verdict form by
holding that a reasonable person could only interpret the answers to mean that
both defendants were direct causes of the accident and therefore liable to the
plaintiff. Id. at 156, 152 N.W.2d at 67.
59. See Carufel v. Steven, 293 N.W.2d 47 (Minn. 1980); Peterson v. Haule, 304
Minn. 160, 230 N.W.2d 51 (1975).
60. 304 Minn. 160, 230 N.W.2d 51 (1975). Plaintiff, a ten-year-old girl, was
injured when she walked into a restaurant’s glass door, causing the glass pane to
fall on top of her. Id. at 161, 230 N.W.2d at 53.
61. Id. at 163–65, 230 N.W.2d at 54.
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62

apportioned liability to both defendants. The jury admitted that
63
they had trouble understanding some of the questions, prompting
the trial judge to revise and resubmit the questions for further
64
deliberation.
As a result, the jury subsequently returned a
consistent special verdict form, finding that the defendants were in
65
fact direct causes of the plaintiff’s injuries.
Upon appeal, the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed that the trial court’s response
to the inconsistent answers was both legitimate and the ideal course
66
of action given the circumstances.
The third option is to simply order a new trial. In Meinke v.
67
Lewandowkski, the Minnesota Supreme Court exercised this option
after the trial judge had improperly reconciled an inconsistent
68
special verdict. While the Meinke court affirmed that ordering a
new trial was a legitimate option, it stressed that it was the least
69
preferable of the three. In fact, the only reason the court elected
to order a new trial was because the trial court, having been
presented with the inconsistent answers, improperly directed the
jury to change specific responses in order to make the special
70
71
verdict consistent. However, having passed the trial court stage,
62. Id. at 164–65, 230 N.W.2d at 54.
63. Id. at 165, 230 N.W.2d at 55.
64. Id. at 166, 230 N.W.2d at 55.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 175, 230 N.W.2d at 60 (“[T]he trial judge could either have ordered
a new trial or sent the jury back for further deliberations . . . . [T]he course
selected by the trial court was the appropriate one under the circumstances of this
case also. It was clearly shown by its answers to the special interrogatories and its
questions to the court that the jury was considerably confused as to direct cause.
To enter judgment for defendants in such a case would be to ignore the realities
of the situation. The trial judge should consider the surrounding circumstances in
disregarding the inconsistent answers of the jury and in sending them back for
further deliberations.”).
67. 306 Minn. 406, 237 N.W.2d 387 (1975). Meinke again involved a plaintiff
who was a passenger in a vehicle, which was involved in a car accident. Plaintiff
sued both drivers. The jury returned a special verdict indicating that only one
defendant was a direct cause of the accident but later apportioned liability to both.
Id. at 407--08, 237 N.W.2d at 389.
68. Id. at 414, 237 N.W.2d at 393.
69. Id. at 412, 237 N.W.2d at 391 (“[I]t has been recognized that the trial
judge, when confronted with this problem, may (1) render judgment against the
party having the burden of proof; (2) order a new trial; or (3) send the jury back
for further deliberations. We believe the interests of justice and economy are
ordinarily best served by the third alternative.” (citation omitted)).
70. Id. at 414, 237 N.W.2d at 392. This was an obvious abuse of discretion, a
problem that would not have existed if the trial court had instead simply reiterated
the notions of direct cause and fault and sent the jury back for further
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ordering a new trial is sometimes the only recourse available to an
appellate court.
Until this point, this note has focused on the origins of
contributory negligence and comparative fault. The discussion will
now shift to the second issue in Daly: primary assumption of risk.
F.

A Brief History of Assumption of Risk

Just as contributory negligence is an affirmative defense, so too
72
Just like contributory negligence, an
is assumption of risk.
assumption of risk defense only comes into play after the injured
73
party has established a prima facie negligence claim.
Since
contributory negligence and assumption of risk were both
originally viewed as complete bars to recovery, the tortfeasor would
74
traditionally raise either one or the other, or both. As both would
completely prevent the plaintiff from being awarded any damages,
75
it really made no practical difference what the defense was called.
Unfortunately, this often led to a misunderstanding regarding the
distinction between the two and commonly caused the two defenses
76
to be confused with one another.
The key distinction between an assumption of risk defense and
contributory negligence is consent. Essentially, assumption of risk
means that the injured party gave his consent to relieve the
tortfeasor of any duty of reasonable care and essentially took his
77
chances in encountering a known danger. This consent can be
express or implied, but it must be given by a plaintiff who (1) had
knowledge of the risk, (2) appreciated the danger of the risk, and
deliberation. As the Minnesota Supreme Court stated, “the trial judge must take
care not to interfere with the jury’s role as the sole determiner of the issues
presented to it.” Id. at 412, 237 N.W.2d at 392.
71. And thus any chance to simply resubmit the questions to the jury for
further deliberation.
72. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 284.
73. As will be discussed infra Part II.F.2, this is a traditional view of
assumption of risk and is not how it is currently done in Minnesota courts.
74. See Bugh v. Webb, 328 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Ark. 1959).
75. See Michael K. Steenson, The Role of Primary Assumption of Risk in Civil
Litigation in Minnesota, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 115, 124 (2003) (“The term
‘primary assumption of risk’ had not yet been utilized for analytical purposes, in
part because there was no clear need to distinguish between those categories of
assumption of risk due to the fact that both were complete bars.”).
76. See generally Petrone v. Margolis, 89 A.2d 476 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1952). This is especially a problem today considering contemporary views of
comparative fault no longer bar a plaintiff’s claim for contributory negligence.
77. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 481.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

13

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 12

288

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

78

(3) voluntarily accepted the risk. However, this does not mean
that any plaintiff who voluntarily encounters a known risk is
79
necessarily consenting to the tortfeasor’s negligence. Prosser and
Keeton’s jaywalker perfectly elucidates this point:
A pedestrian who walks across the street in the middle of a
block, through a stream of traffic travelling at excessive
speed, cannot by any stretch of the imagination be found
to consent that the drivers shall not use care to watch for
him and avoid running him down. On the contrary, he is
insisting that they shall. This is contributory negligence
80
pure and simple; it is not assumption of risk.
In Prosser and Keeton’s scenario, although the jaywalker will likely
be found contributorily negligent and thus see his damages
reduced, he will not be completely barred from recovery by an
assumption of risk defense.
Early assumption of risk cases were born out of the master81
Notably, the employer-employee
servant relationship.
relationship is based in subjective contract law, rather than the
reasonable-conduct standard, an objective concept, which
82
underlies tort principle. In the employment context, assumption
of risk was used to bar recovery for employees who were injured
83
while performing a dangerous job. It was thought that employees
assumed the risks of an employer’s negligence in exchange for
wages and benefits—again, reiterating the contract-based
84
conception of the parties’ relationship. Unfortunately, this line of
reasoning would often lead to disproportionately harsh results for a
85
number of employees.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C (1965).
79. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 485.
80. Id.
81. See Priestley v. Fowler, (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 1030 (Exch.).
82. See Ann D. Bray, Comment, Does Old Wine Get Better with Age or Turn to
Vinegar? Assumption of Risk in a Comparative Fault Era—Andren v. White Rodgers,
18 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1992).
83. See Steenson, supra note 75, at 117–24 (discussing the origins of primary
assumption of risk in Minnesota as it relates to the duties an employer owes an
employee).
84. Bray, supra note 82, at 1144; see also Steenson, supra note 75, at 125 (“The
operation of assumption of risk in the master-servant context was rationalized on
the basis that the servant contracted for the master’s immunity in return for the
payment of wages.”).
85. Bray, supra note 82, at 1144 n.26 (citing Anderson v. H.C. Akelely Lumber
Co., 47 Minn. 128, 49 N.W. 664 (1891). In Anderson, Plaintiff was injured when the
belt on a planing machine broke. 47 Minn. 128, 49 N.W. 664. Plaintiff had
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Interestingly enough, English common law, from which
assumption of risk is derived, was quick to acknowledge the
86
economic pressure of workers under threat of losing their jobs.
Accordingly, English courts were wary of the assertion that an
87
employee voluntarily accepts the risks simply by being employed.
American courts were much slower in arriving at this notion, and a
number of courts upheld assumption of risk defenses even when
the plaintiff was injured under a direct command of an employer
threatening to terminate employment if the injured party had
88
acted otherwise. Fortunately, this line of reasoning was largely
89
abandoned with the passage of workers’ compensation acts.
1.

The Effect of Comparative Fault Reformation on Assumption
of Risk

As stated previously, assumption of risk and contributory
90
negligence were at one time thought of as one in the same. This
would drastically change with the widespread adoption of
comparative fault statutes that took place in the mid to late
91
twentieth century. Minnesota adopted its own system of modified
comparative fault with the 1969 passage of Minnesota Statute
92
section 604.01, which, like many other jurisdictions, barred
significant consequences to Minnesota’s conception of assumption
of risk. Contributory negligence was no longer a complete bar, and

reported the worn belt to his foreman, who told plaintiff to continue working. Id.
The court acknowledged that the employer was negligent in failing to replace or
repair a worn belt. Id. at 130, 49 N.W. at 604. However, the court held that
plaintiff had assumed the risk because it “does not appear that any necessity rested
upon him to proceed with the use of the machine,” and plaintiff could have
repaired the belt himself, “although it was not within the general scope of his duty
to repair belts in the mill.” Id. at 130, 49 N.W. at 665.
86. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 491 n.16 (listing cases that
recognize the economic pressure of workers under threat of loss of employment).
87. Id. at 491.
88. See, e.g., Dougherty v. W. Superior Iron & Steel Co., 60 N.W. 274 (Wis.
1894).
89. See Bray, supra note 82, at 1149–50 (stating that assumption of risk was
eventually removed from the master-servant relationship with the enactment of
workers’ compensation laws but remained popular in other tort actions like
negligence claims).
90. See supra note 72--76 and accompanying text.
91. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15 (Westlaw, Westlaw through 2011 Reg.
Sess.); see also Christopher Curran, The Spread of the Comparative Negligence Rule in
the United States, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 317, 319–21 (1992).
92. MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (2010).
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courts were suddenly faced with a need to clarify how assumption
of risk and comparative fault differed. A number of jurisdictions
held that assumption of risk should either be abandoned
altogether or merged with their respective comparative fault
93
systems. Other jurisdictions, including Minnesota, have chosen to
distinguish between various forms of assumption of risk and
employed a number of different terms to describe the distinction,
such as “express” versus “implied,” or “reasonable” versus
94
“unreasonable.”
Minnesota has chosen to distinguish between
95
“primary” assumption of risk and “secondary” assumption of risk.
Secondary assumption of risk is essentially another way of referring
to the contributory negligence defense and will not be further
96
discussed here.
2.

Minnesota’s Confusing Conception of Primary Assumption
of Risk

As subtle as it may seem, primary assumption of risk is actually a
much different concept than the traditional assumption of risk
defense. The key difference is that primary assumption of risk is
97
not an affirmative defense at all. Instead, primary assumption of
risk relates to the issue of whether the plaintiff was actually owed a
98
duty in the first place. Thus, it is not an affirmative defense, but
99
rather a means of negating a plaintiff’s prima facie claim. The
basic elements of primary assumption of risk remain the same: (1)
knowledge of the risk, (2) appreciation of the danger, and (3)
93. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So.2d 287, 293 (Fla. 1977); Abernathy v.
Eline Oil Field Servs., Inc., 650 P.2d 772, 775 (Mont. 1982); Rutter v. Ne. Beaver
Cnty. Sch. Dist., 437 A.2d 1198, 1209 n.5 (Pa. 1983) (showing nineteen states that
have abolished the assumption of risk doctrine, including: Alaska, California,
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Texas,
Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
94. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 496–98.
95. See generally Springrose v. Willmore, 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826
(1971).
96. Id. at 23, 192 N.W.2d at 826 (“Implied assumption of risk, in its secondary
sense as an affirmative defense in tort actions, will hereafter, including the instant
case, be limited to those situations in which the voluntary encountering of a
known and appreciated risk is unreasonable. It is to be considered a phase of
contributory negligence, to be submitted with and apportioned under our
comparative negligence statute . . . .”).
97. Id. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827.
98. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 68, at 496–97.
99. Id.
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100

voluntarily acceptance of the risk.
If successful, primary
assumption of risk will relieve the tortfeasor of any duty to the
101
injured party, thereby completely barring any recovery.
In Minnesota, the seminal case discussing primary assumption
102
Taking place just two years after
of risk is Springrose v. Willimore.
the enactment of section 604.01, the Springrose court sought to
clarify the role of assumption of risk given Minnesota’s recent
103
adoption of modified comparative fault.
In doing so, the court
established the “primary” and “secondary” assumption of risk
distinction:
Assumption of risk has been conceptually distinguished
according to its primary or secondary character. Primary
assumption of risk, express or implied, relates to the
initial issue of whether a defendant was negligent at
all—that is, whether the defendant had any duty to
protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm. It is not,
104
therefore, an affirmative defense.
Furthermore, the Springrose opinion limited the types of scenarios
105
in which the implied primary assumption of risk should apply,
citing “landowner-licensee” and “inherently dangerous sporting
106
event” cases as illustrative.
The cases immediately following Springrose reiterated the
relationship between primary assumption of risk and the duty

100. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496(C) (1965).
101. DOBBS ET AL., supra note 3, at 289–91.
102. 292 Minn. 23, 192 N.W.2d 826 (1971). Springrose involved a plaintiff who
was injured in an accident after riding in a car with knowledge that the driver was
inexperienced and was drag-racing other cars. Id. at 26–27, 192 N.W.2d at 828–29.
103. Id. at 24–25, 192 N.W.2d at 827 (“The practical and most important
impact of this decision is to mandate that, like any other form of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk must be apportioned under our comparative
negligence statute . . . .”).
104. Id. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827.
105. Id.; Steenson, supra note 75, at 131 (“The most important point of the
court’s discussion of primary assumption of risk is that it has limited reach . . . .”).
106. Springrose, 292 Minn. at 24, 192 N.W.2d at 827; see also Daly v. McFarland,
812 N.W.2d 113, 116 (Minn. 2012) (citing Grisim v. TapeMark Charity Pro-Am
Golf Tournament, 415 N.W.2d 874, 876 (Minn. 1987)) (relieving amateur golfers
of duty of care towards spectators); Rieger v. Zackoski, 321 N.W.2d 16, 23–24
(Minn. 1982) (relieving duty of care towards patrons at the track during a
sanctioned auto race); Moe v. Steenberg, 275 Minn. 448, 450, 147 N.W.2d 587, 589
(1966) (relieving defendant of duty of care in ice skating collisions); Modec v. City
of Eveleth, 224 Minn. 556, 563, 29 N.W.2d 453, 457 (1947) (barring claims by
spectators at a hockey game).
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107

question.
Initially, Minnesota courts completely couched the
108
primary assumption of risk analysis within the duty question.
Primary assumption of risk was viewed as one of many elements in
109
determining whether the injured party was owed a duty.
Therefore, if a duty did exist, primary assumption of risk, by
110
definition, would be inapplicable.
This methodology will be
referred to as a non-sequential analysis.
Such was the case until a recent pair of Minnesota Supreme
Court rulings started to examine primary assumption of risk
111
completely independent from the duty question.
Instead of
viewing primary assumption of risk as a contributing factor in
determining the duty question, the court removed primary

107. An illustrative case is Bakhos v. Driver, which involved a plaintiff who fell
from a tree while attempting to remove a branch with a power saw. 275 N.W.2d
594 (Minn. 1979). At trial, the jury ruled the defendant was 60% negligent when
he pulled on a rope attached to the limb the plaintiff was sawing. Id. at 595. The
jury then held that the plaintiff assumed the risk and entered judgment for the
defendant. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, and held that, as a
matter of law, the evidence showed that the plaintiff had not assumed the risk and
remanded to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor the plaintiff according
to the 60%/40% apportionment. Id. Defendant’s negligence was ruled to be
both the cause of the accident and could not have been foreseen by the plaintiff.
Id. Therefore, even though the plaintiff did ultimately choose to ascend the tree,
“he did not voluntarily choose to expose himself to the risk of the negligent
actions of the defendant which caused the fall.” Id. Because this duty still existed
as at the time of the fall, it cannot be said that the plaintiff had assumed the risk.
Id. The Bakhos opinion serves as a clear indication that, at the time, the court
viewed primary assumption of risk to be linked to the duty issue in an almost
symbiotic manner—because the plaintiff lacked the three elements of assumption
of risk, the defendant’s general duty of reasonable care still existed, thereby
making primary assumption of risk inapplicable. Id.
108. Steenson, supra note 75, at 138 (“[P]rimary assumption of risk in the cases
it might reach are in effect cases involving the defendant’s duty to the plaintiff.”).
109. Id. at 142–43 (referencing Springrose, “prior supreme court decisions
appear to view primary assumption of risk as an integral part of the duty
determination”).
110. Two years after the decision in Bakhos, the Minnesota Supreme Court
once again visited the link between primary assumption of risk and duty in Iepson
v. Noren. 308 N.W.2d 812 (1981). There, the court held that primary assumption
of risk did not bar plaintiff’s recovery from injuries sustained when his motorbike
collided with a pickup truck. Id. at 815--16. The court followed reasoning from
both Springrose and Prosser to conclude that plaintiff never consented to relieve
the defendants of their duty to act reasonably, thereby making primary assumption
of risk inapplicable. Id. at 815–16; see also Steenson, supra note 75, at 138 (“The
important point is that primary assumption of risk is inapplicable where the
defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff.”).
111. See Baber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493 (Minn. 1995); see also Louis v. Louis, 636
N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2001).
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assumption of risk from the duty question altogether. Under the
new methodology, the existence of a duty must first be established
before any discussion of primary assumption of risk can take
113
place.
The court’s reasoning was as follows: (1) primary
114
assumption of risk serves to relieve a defendant of his or her duty
to the plaintiff; (2) if the defendant owes no duty in the first place
then there is nothing of which to relieve; and (3) therefore, any
115
subsequent discussion of primary assumption of risk is pointless.
This conception of primary assumption of risk will be referred to as
the sequential method.
Until this point, this note has focused on the origins of
contributory negligence, comparative fault, and primary
assumption of risk. The discussion will now shift to the final issue
in Daly: emergency rule instruction.
G.

Emergency Rule Instruction

Minnesota courts have dealt with the emergency doctrine as
116
far back as 1879. The pivotal case, however, is the 1935 decision
in Johnson v. Townsend, in which the court laid out the modern
expression of the emergency doctrine:
[O]ne suddenly confronted by a peril, through no fault of
his own, who, in the attempt to escape, does not choose
the best or safest way, should not be held negligent
because of such choice, unless it was so hazardous that the
ordinarily prudent person would not have made it under
117
similar conditions.
The Johnson definition of the emergency rule was reaffirmed in
118
Byrns v. St. Louis County, as well as in a number of additional
119
cases.
112. Baber, 531 N.W.2d at 495.
113. Id. (“Before a court considers assumption of risk, it should first determine
whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. If no duty exists there is no
need to determine whether a person assumed the risk thus relieving the defendant
of the duty.”).
114. “Relieving” is meant in the sense that no duty exists. Steenson, supra note
75, at 138 (“It is important to note that in these cases when the court speaks in
terms of ‘relieving’ a defendant of liability, it is concluding that the defendant
owes no duty to the plaintiff under certain circumstances.”).
115. Baber, 531 N.W.2d at 495.
116. See Wilson v. N. Pac. R.R. Co., 26 Minn. 278, 3 N.W. 333 (1879).
117. 195 Minn. 107, 110, 261 N.W. 859, 861 (1935).
118. 295 N.W.2d 517 (Minn. 1980).
119. 4 MICHAEL K. STEENSON & PETER B. KNAPP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: JURY
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Whereas Johnson laid out the general rule of the emergency
120
In
doctrine, a number of cases focus on its individual elements.
Gran v. Dasovic, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted emergency
rule instructions precisely because the defendant driver’s
121
encounter with an ice patch was deemed “sudden.” In Gran, the
slope of the road and its deceptively dry condition were key to
122
ruling that the ice patch effectively came out of nowhere.
The
district court in Daly would use similar reasoning to find that a
“sudden peril” in a snowmobiling case would be something akin to
123
a deer jumping into the road.
In addition to the “suddenness” element, the emergency
doctrine requires that the peril must not be caused by the party
124
requesting the instructions.
This element was discussed in
Thielbar v. Juenke, in which a school bus in the middle of an
125
intersection was ruled to not constitute “sudden peril.” Such was
the case because the bus was in plain sight; the tortfeasor had
entered the intersection at excessive speed and made no attempt to
126
avoid a collision. Recognizing that it would be unfair to allow the
defendant to be advantaged by its application, the court held that
the emergency rule “cannot be . . . invoked by a party who has
brought the emergency upon himself or who has failed in the
127
application of due care to avoid it.”

INSTRUCTION GUIDES—CIVIL § 25.16 (5th ed. 2012) (listing a number of cases
reaffirming the Johnson court’s description of the emergency rule).
120. Although there are a number of different elements to the emergency
doctrine, only those pertinent to the Daly decision will be examined.
121. 275 Minn. 415, 419–20, 147 N.W.2d 576, 579–80 (1966).
122. Id.
123. Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 124 (Minn. 2012) (discussing how in
declining to give emergency rule instructions, the district court likened an
emergency in this situation to a deer jumping in the middle of the road).
124. STEENSON & KNAPP, supra note 119 (“This rule cannot be invoked by one
who, through his own fault, created the emergency.” (citing Mathews v. Mills, 288
Minn. 16, 24, 178 N.W.2d 841, 846 (1970); Kachman v. Blosberg, 251 Minn. 224,
235, 87 N.W.2d 687, 695–96 (1958))).
125. 291 Minn. 129, 133–34, 189 N.W.2d 493, 496–97 (1971); see also Kachman
v. Blosberg, 251 Minn. 224, 235, 87 N.W.2d 687, 695 (1958) (establishing that
before emergency instructions can be given, there must be a finding that the peril
in question was not brought about by the party requesting the instruction).
126. Theilbar, 291 Minn. at 134, 189 N.W.2d at 497.
127. Id. (quoting Kachman, 251 Minn. at 235, 87 N.W.2d at 696).
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III. THE DALY DECISION
In January 2007, Christopher Daly, Zachary McFarland, Neil
Forsberg, and Jeff Engelkes were riding their snowmobiles four
abreast as they crossed a bean field near Engelkes’s engine repair
128
shop.
Approaching a ditch at the end of the field, Daly slowed
129
In doing so,
down and McFarland began to pass him.
130
McFarland’s snowmobile hit a snow drift and vaulted into the air.
Trying to avoid injury, McFarland pushed the snowmobile away
131
Unable to avoid it, Daly
from his body and into Daly’s path.
collided with McFarland’s airborne snowmobile and suffered
132
injuries when he was thrown from his own snowmobile.
Daly sued McFarland for injuries sustained as a result of the
accident, claiming that McFarland was negligent in not adjusting
133
his speed to deal with drifts.
Responding to five questions listed
on a special verdict form, a unanimous jury found that both Daly
134
and McFarland were negligent, but Daly’s negligence was not a
135
However, the jury then proceeded
direct cause of the accident.
136
Despite this
to allocate 30% of the fault of the accident to Daly.
inconsistency, the district court entered judgment for Daly in the
137
amount of $442,633.50, the full amount of damages. McFarland
moved for a new trial based on three alleged errors: (1) failure to
instruct the jury on the primary assumption of risk doctrine, (2)
failure to instruct the jury on the emergency rule, and (3) an
138
improper reconciliation of the jury’s special verdict form answers.
128. Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 117.
129. Id.
130. Id. Daly testified that McFarland’s snowmobile “just shot straight up in
the air.” Id. at 118.
131. Id. at 117.
132. Id.
133. See MINN. STAT. § 84.87, subdiv. 2(1) (2010) (making it illegal to operate a
snowmobile at a rate of speed greater than reasonable or proper given the
circumstances).
134. Daly admitted that at the time of the crash, he was wearing headphones
and listening to music. Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 118.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Daly v. McFarland, No. 53-CV-08-117, 2010 WL 1751801 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Mar. 23, 2010), aff’d in part No. A10-1184, 2011 WL 206193 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan.
25, 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 812 N.W.2d 113 (Minn. 2012).
138. Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 119. It should be noted that the author has decided
to focus this case note solely on the court’s application of the primary assumption
of risk doctrine and the emergency rule instructions, as these are the issues most
pertinent to tort law. Whether the district court abused its discretion in
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The district court denied the motion in its entirety and the court of
139
appeals affirmed.
After granting certiorari, the Minnesota Supreme Court
140
affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
The court
affirmed the decision to deny both the primary assumption of
141
142
risk and the emergency rule instructions.
However, it was also
found that the district court abused its discretion in reconciling the
143
inconsistent answers to the special verdict form. For the court, it
was irreconcilable that Daly be both not causally negligent and
144
apportioned 30% of the fault for the accident.
The court
reasoned that the jury believed McFarland to be either 70% or
100% at fault, and therefore remanded to the district court with
instructions to enter a remittitur allowing Daly to choose between
145
$309,843.45 in damages or a new trial.
IV. ANALYSIS
The previous sections of this note were designed to build the
appropriate historical background of the three issues involved in
Daly. Having done so, this note now turns to whether the court’s
decision in Daly was appropriate in light of that historical context.
As will be shown, although the court ultimately got the Daly
decision right, it missed a key chance to rid Minnesota of some
confusing legal doctrines.

reconciling the answers to the special verdict form is a question best saved for the
civil procedure realm.
139. Daly, 2011 WL 206193.
140. Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 127.
141. Id. at 119–22.
142. Id. at 122–24.
143. Id. at 124–27.
144. Id. at 126 (“[T]he jury answered one question by concluding that Daly
was not causally negligent, and then concluded in the very next question . . . that Daly
was causally negligent for 30% of the accident. These answers are directly
contradictory and not subject to reconciliation.”).
145. Id. at 127. It is necessary to note the dissent of Justice Anderson, who
disagrees with the majority’s assessment that the special verdict answers are
irreconcilable. Given the broad discretion trial courts typically have in reconciling
answers, Justice Anderson believes the district court’s interpretation is plausible,
thereby freeing the district court of any abuse of discretion charge. Id. at 127–30
(Anderson, J., dissenting).
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The Response to the Inconsistent Special Verdict Answers
Was Appropriate

The court’s issuance of a remittitur was generally appropriate
given the circumstances. Although it is not considered one of the
146
the issuance of a
three responses courts typically utilize,
remittitur has been established as a viable course of action in
147
Minnesota.
Ultimately, the remittitur was a creative solution to
the trial court’s abuse of discretion.
Ideally, the trial court should have elected to clarify the
distinction between fault and cause apportionment and resubmit
the special verdict to the jury for further deliberation. Although it
is true that answers to special verdict forms should be liberally
construed, the purpose of doing so is to maintain the true intent of
148
the jury. Minnesota case law has shown over and over again that
juries are often confused on the distinction between cause and
149
fault apportionment.
When faced with inconsistent answers, the
best way of maintaining the jury’s intent is to first clarify the
confusion and then allow further deliberation. Whether it is
conceivable that Question 5 in the special verdict form was simply
superfluous should not matter. What matters is that the responses
accurately reflect the intention of the jury, which can be easily
attained by clarifying the confusion and resubmitting the special
150
verdict form.
Obviously, the Minnesota Supreme Court is not in a position
to simply resubmit questions to a jury. However, the remittitur
offers a nice compromise between the remaining options of
reconciling the answers or ordering a new trial. Although the
answers to the special verdict form were directly inconsistent, it is
clear that the jury believed McFarland was either 70% or 100%
146. Again, the three options are: reconciliation, resubmission, or the
ordering of a new trial. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
147. See Prodgroski v. Kerwin, 147 Minn. 103, 179 N.W. 679 (1920).
148. Reese v. Henke, 277 Minn. 151, 155, 152 N.W.2d 63, 66 (1967) (“[I]t is
necessary to keep in mind that the verdict is to be liberally construed to give effect
to the intention of the jury and to harmonize answers to interrogatories if it is
possible to do so.”).
149. See generally supra Part II.E.
150. The dissent argues that the district court is in the best position to know
the jury’s true intent when answering the special verdict form. Daly, 812 N.W.2d at
129 (Anderson, J., dissenting). This argument seems to overlook the option of
simply asking the jury to clarify what its intent was, instead of attempting to
reconcile inconsistent answers in an effort to reflect what the district court
thought the jury’s intent was.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2012

23

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 12

298

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1

151

responsible for the accident.
Issuing a remittitur gives Daly, the
beneficiary of the trial court’s decision, the choice of accepting
lesser damages and avoiding the costs of a new trial. Or, if Daly so
chooses, he can follow the traditional course of action and
implement a new trial. Although its issuance is not a traditional
option for dealing with inconsistent jury verdicts, a remittitur is a
152
well-established remedy in other areas of Minnesota case law.
This seems a creative and fair compromise given the
153
circumstances.
Going forward, trial courts should be especially aware of the
confusing nature of fault apportionment. When faced with
inconsistent answers to interrogatories, trial judges should be
hesitant to reconcile the answers without attempting to clarify and
resubmit to the jury. Trial judges can also be proactive by ensuring
that the questions on special verdict forms are framed such that the
apportionment questions are only answered if direct cause has first
154
been established. By clearing up confusion at the trial level, trial
155
judges can preserve judicial economy and ensure that special
verdict forms reflect the true intention of the jury.
B.

Primary Assumption of Risk
1.

The Denial of Primary Assumption of Risk in Daly
Was Appropriate

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to not apply primary
assumption of risk doctrine to Daly fits logically in the continuum
151. Id. at 127 (majority opinion).
152. See, e.g., Runia v. Marguth Agency, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 45 (Minn. 1989)
(upholding the validity of remittiturs in Minnesota); Podgroski, 147 Minn. at 104,
179 N.W. at 680 (“[T]his court may grant a new trial for excessive or inadequate
damages and make it conditional upon the party against whom the motion is
directed consenting to a reduction or an increase of the verdict.”).
153. Furthermore, it would seem particularly unfair to force Daly to undergo a
new trial even if he would rather take reduced damages and avoid further legal
fees and time commitment. In actuality, Daly did elect to accept the reduced
damages.
154. See Meinke v. Lewandowski, 306 Minn. 406, 410, 237 N.W.2d 387, 390
(1975) (“Either as a preface to the comparative negligence question in the special
verdict or in the court’s instructions . . . the jury should be told the previous
answers or findings which make necessary an answer to the comparative
negligence question.” (quoting Orwick v. Belshan, 304 Minn. 338, 345, 231
N.W.2d 90, 95 (1975))).
155. Especially considering that an abuse of discretion will inevitably lead to an
order for a new trial.
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156

of Minnesota case law.
As previously stated, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has applied two different approaches to primary
157
assumption of risk.
Initially, the court conceived of primary
assumption of risk as a factor in the duty question. Recently,
however, the court has employed a sequential analysis: analyzing
duty independently before primary assumption of risk is even
allowed to enter the discussion.
Under either methodology, primary assumption of risk is
inapplicable to Daly. According to Minnesota Statute section 84.87,
subdivision 2, McFarland owes Daly a duty of due care to operate
his snowmobile in a reasonable manner given the conditions and
158
the speed at which they are traveling. The existence of this duty
immediately rules out primary assumption of risk under a non159
Under the more recent sequential analysis,
sequential analysis.
the existence of this duty would allow a discussion of primary
assumption of risk to take place. However, it clearly cannot be said
that Daly, simply by participating in the ride, (1) had knowledge of
the risk, (2) appreciated its danger, and (3) voluntarily accepted
the risks. McFarland himself testified that in his twenty years of
snowmobiling, he has never had a snowdrift react the way this one
160
did. This statement indicates that neither party was aware of this
type of snowdrift, nor did they appreciate the risks it posed.
Clearly, it cannot be said that by simply participating, Daly was
consenting to the risk of McFarland negligently running into the
snowdrift, having it throw his vehicle in the air, and come crashing
down into Daly’s path.
2.

A Flawed System

As the previous analysis has shown, primary assumption of risk
in Minnesota is confusing, convoluted, and in need of reform. The
very fact that two methodologies exist shows how unclear primary
161
assumption of risk can be. Before a discussion of its three factors
156. See Carpenter v. Mattison, 300 Minn. 273, 219 N.W.2d 625 (1974); Olson
v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 216 N.W.2d 124 (1974).
157. See supra Part II.F.2.
158. MINN. STAT. § 84.87, subdiv. 2 (2012).
159. Steenson, supra note 75, at 138 (“The important point is that primary
assumption of risk is inapplicable where the defendant owes a duty to the
plaintiff.”).
160. Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 118 (Minn. 2012).
161. See Baber v. Dill, 531 N.W.2d 493, 495 (Minn. 1995). Notably, the
statement, “If no duty exists, then no primary assumption of risk exists,” is logically
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even takes place, it is unclear where or how primary assumption of
risk relates to the duty issue.
The biggest problem with Minnesota’s conception of primary
assumption of risk is that it appears to be in direct contradiction
with the motivation behind the move toward comparative fault. As
stated previously, the move away from all-or-nothing contributory
negligence signaled a change in emphasis in tort goals: shifting
from deterring negligent action to focusing on compensating
injury. Minnesota’s primary assumption of risk system echoes of
162
the deterrent-based systems of the past.
The problem lies in the
multiple opportunities the tortfeasor has to cut down the injured
party’s recovery. Ultimately, a tortfeasor will have three chances to
reduce his liability. First, he can argue that no duty existed. If that
fails, he can go on to argue that the injured party primarily
assumed the risk. But if a primary assumption of risk analysis is
supposed to take place independently from the duty issue, as it is
supposed to under Minnesota’s adoption of the sequential
163
analysis, where is the assumption of risk analysis supposed to
happen? Does it once again come in as an affirmative defense?
But what about Springrose’s comments that primary assumption of
164
risk is explicitly not an affirmative defense?
But even at the tortfeasor’s failure to show primary assumption
of risk, he is still afforded one more whack at the injured party’s
claim—he can always fall back on comparative fault in order to
reduce his damages. The injured party’s claim is forced to survive a

equivalent (via contrapositive) to the statement: “If primary assumption of risk does
exist, then a duty does exist.” Ultimately, this equivocation may not be particularly
useful given the point of a sequential analysis is to look first at duty before moving
to primary assumption of risk discussion. However, it does show the stark
difference between a sequential analysis (where we said “if primary assumption of
risk exists, then a duty does exist”) and a non-sequential analysis (where we said “if
primary assumption of risk exists, then a duty does not exist”). Although the Baber
court deemed it “elementary” that the sequential analysis is the correct
methodology, this comparison shows how drastic a change the Baber opinion truly
was.
162. This is especially the case with the strict sequential system.
163. See generally Louis v. Louis, 636 N.W.2d 314 (Minn. 2001); Baber, 531
N.W.2d 493.
164. Springrose v. Willimore, 292 Minn. 23, 24, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827 (1971)
(“Primary assumption of risk, express or implied, relates to the initial issue of
whether a defendant was negligent at all—that is, whether the defendant had any
duty to protect the plaintiff from a risk of harm. It is not, therefore, an affirmative
defense.”).
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three-part attack in order to be entitled to any recovery.
This is
unreasonable. The move from the all-or-nothing contributory
negligence system to the comparative fault system was motivated by
a conscious shift from an approach based on deterrence to an
166
approach based on compensation.
But Minnesota’s current
system so heavily favors the tortfeasor that it harkens back to a
deterrence-based approach to dividing up fault—an approach that
was heavily flawed for placing too much of the burden on a single
167
party for a loss that was caused by two.
In order to more
accurately reflect the compensatory motivation behind
contemporary fault apportionment, the sequential approach to
primary assumption of risk must be abandoned.
Instead,
Minnesota courts should either clearly limit primary assumption of
risk to the non-sequential approach seen in Springrose or join other
jurisdictions in abandoning primary assumption of risk in favor of
168
sole reliance on the comparative fault doctrine.
3.

Snowmobiling Does Not Qualify Under Springrose’s
Purposefully Narrow Application of Primary Assumption of Risk
169

In an important point of the Springrose opinion, the court
sought to strictly limit the types of scenarios to which primary
170
assumption of risk would apply.
Specifically, the court makes
mention of “licensees upon another’s property” and “patrons of

165. Steenson, supra note 75, at 147 (“The defendant would have two
opportunities to persuade the court and the jury that the plaintiff should not be
entitled to recover, and then still rely on the fallback position that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, assuming adverse findings on the duty and breach and
primary assumption of risk issues.”).
166. See supra Part II.D.2.
167. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 67, at 468–69.
168. See, e.g., McGrath v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 196 A.2d 238, 240–41 (N.J. 1963);
see also Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So.2d 1123, 1130 (La. 1988) (citing
HENRY WOODS, COMPARATIVE FAULT, §§ 6.1–6.8. (2d ed. 1987) (“[S]ixteen states
have totally abolished the defense, and seventeen more have eliminated the use of
assumption of risk terminology in all cases except those involving express or
contractual consent by the plaintiff . . . . [A]ssumption of the risk now appears to
be passing from the scene in most common law jurisdictions.”)).
169. See Steenson, supra note 75, at 130, 159 (arguing that the “most important
point of the court’s discussion of primary assumption of risk [in Springrose] is that
it has limited reach” and that “[t]he Eighth Circuit is right in its observation that
the supreme court has narrowed the application of the [primary assumption of
risk] doctrine”).
170. Springrose v. Willimore, 292 Minn. 23, 25–26, 192 N.W.2d 826, 827–28
(1971).
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inherently dangerous sporting events” as illustrative scenarios to
171
Despite this
which primary assumption of risk might apply.
limited application, McFarland contends that riding a snowmobile
172
qualifies as an “abnormally dangerous sporting activity.”
The
173
Minnesota Supreme Court has twice rejected this classification.
The court’s explicit unwillingness to go along with McFarland’s
classification, combined with the emphasis placed on stare
174
175
decisis, made McFarland’s task too formidable to overcome.
4.

A Dangerous Precedent

The previous sections have discussed how the court’s denial of
primary assumption of risk was appropriate given Minnesota case
law. The analysis was backward-looking and sought guidance
through a historical examination. The Daly decision, however, is
also appropriate when applying a forward-looking analysis. Had
the court ruled that snowmobiling did constitute an “abnormally
dangerous sporting activity,” the door would be open for primary
assumption of risk to creep into areas not intended by the narrowly
focused Springrose opinion. If primary assumption of risk can be
raised in a snowmobiling case, how long until it is seen in a
176
motorcycle case? Automobiles? Suddenly, in any case involving a
car crash, the defendant driver will simply assert that the plaintiff,
by choosing to get behind the wheel, assumed the risk of getting
into an accident. Now, no driver will be liable because primary
assumption of risk absolves the defendant of any duty and thereby

171. Id. at 24–25, 192 N.W.2d at 827.
172. Daly v. McFarland, 812 N.W.2d 113, 121 (Minn. 2012).
173. See Carpenter v. Mattison, 300 Minn. 273, 273, 219 N.W.2d 625, 625
(1974); Olson v. Hansen, 299 Minn. 39, 44, 216 N.W.2d 125, 128 (1974).
174. See State v. Martin, 773 N.W.2d 89, 98 (Minn. 2009) (noting that due to
the principle of stare decisis, the court will “require a ‘compelling reason’ before a
decision will be overruled”).
175. Furthermore, because evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Daly,
the court would accept Daly’s claim that snowmobiles are equally or more safe
today than they were when Olson and Carpenter were decided. Therefore, the
court’s car analogy still holds true. See Daly, 812 N.W.2d at 121.
176. Some may be quick to point out that tortfeasors in this scenario would
owe a statutory duty to the injured party, much in the same way McFarland did in
Daly. Even if this is the case, under a sequential analysis, in which duty is
examined independent of primary assumption of risk, the injured party’s claim
may still be barred.
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acts as a complete bar to plaintiff’s claim.
Ruling that
snowmobiling constitutes an inherently dangerous sporting activity
would be a dangerous precedent to set.
C.

The Emergency Rule Should Not Be Applied to Daly and Should Be
Abandoned in Minnesota

In following the definition of the emergency rule, as laid out
177
in Johnson, the court correctly denied McFarland’s request for
emergency rule instructions. However, as the Daly case exhibits,
emergency rule instructions are more cumbersome than
178
beneficial.
Although the decision to deny an emergency rule
instruction was correct, the court simply did not go far enough.
Given the Johnson definition of the emergency rule, the court
correctly denied its instruction because of a lack of two elements:
(1) the peril encountered was not sudden, and (2) the peril
179
This is not
encountered was created by McFarland’s own doing.
180
a case of a deer jumping into the middle of the road. First, as the
court notes, great credence is placed on the suddenness element of
181
It is unclear how encountering a snowdrift
the emergency rule.
could constitute a sudden emergency. McFarland himself testified
182
that snowdrifts are a common occurrence when snowmobiling.
183
encountering a
Although it may not have been visible,
commonplace snowdrift is not akin to a sudden emergency
requiring the type of instinctive reaction typically seen in
184
emergency rule cases.
Additionally, as opposed to the “deer
jumping in the road” example, any peril presented to McFarland
was the result of his own driving, thereby precluding him from
177. Johnson v. Townsend, 195 Minn. 107, 110, 261 N.W. 859, 861 (1935).
178. See Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Modern Status of Sudden Emergency
Doctrine, 10 A.L.R. 5th § 3[a]–[b], at 680 (1993) (presenting many jurisdictions
that have abandoned the doctrine because of its habit of confusing the jury).
179. Johnson, 195 Minn. at 110, 261 N.W. at 861.
180. The district court stated that an emergency in the Daly situation would
have to be something akin to a deer jumping out in the middle of the road. Daly,
812 N.W.2d. at 123.
181. Id. (“The essential requirement underlying the emergency rule is
confrontation of a sudden peril requiring an instinctive reaction.”).
182. Id. at 123–24 (referencing McFarland’s testimony that snowdrifts can be
described as a normal hazard of snowmobiling).
183. McFarland testified that he never saw the drift as hazardous before he hit
it. Id. at 118. It remains unclear if this means he did not see it at all.
184. For instance, consider the district court’s example of a deer jumping onto
the road.
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185

requesting emergency rule instructions.
Because (1) the peril
resulted from McFarland’s own actions, and (2) there was no
“suddenness” to the supposed emergency, the court correctly
declined emergency rule instructions.
Although the court was accurate in its denial, it is
disappointing that it did not put an end to the emergency rule
altogether. At best, the emergency rule is designed to recognize
that an emergency situation may cause a reasonable person to act
186
incorrectly but not negligently.
However, the granting of
emergency rule instructions too often confuses the jury into
thinking that a general duty of due care analysis is inapplicable to
187
an emergency situation.
Furthermore, emergency instructions
188
are already encompassed in the general standard of due care.
The sudden peril of an emergency should simply be one of the
circumstances that the jury may consider in determining how a
reasonable person would have behaved in the same or similar
circumstances. Because any potential benefit (and arguably no
benefit when considered to be already encompassed in the general
standard of due care) is outweighed by the propensity for
confusion, the emergency rule doctrine should be dismissed.
Minnesota should join the number of other states that have
189
altogether dismissed the emergency rule as a viable legal theory.
V. CONCLUSION
Generally, the Minnesota Supreme Court got Daly right. The
ordering of a remittitur was a creative solution to the abuse of
185. Daly, 812 N.W.2d. at 124.
186. See Scott Andrew Irby, Case Note, Wiles v. Webb: The Abrupt End of the
Sudden Emergency Doctrine in Arkansas, 51 ARK. L. REV. 833, 843–49 (1998)
(discussing the emergency rule and its confusion in relation to the general
standard of care).
187. Ghent, supra note 178, § 3[a] (“Even the wording of a well-drawn
instruction intimates that ordinary rules of negligence do not apply to the
circumstances constituting the claimed sudden emergency . . . .”); see also Irby,
supra note 186, at 833 (discussing Wiles v. Webb, 946 S.W.2d 685, 686 (Ark. 1997),
in which the court ruled that emergency rule instructions were “inherently
confusing”).
188. See Lyons v. Midnight Sun Transp. Servs., Inc., 928 P.2d 1202, 1206
(Alaska 1996) (“We believe that the sudden emergency instruction is a generally
useless appendage to the law of negligence. With or without an emergency, the
standard of care . . . is still that of a reasonable person under the circumstances.”).
189. See Ghent, supra note 178, §§ 3–4 (listing a number of jurisdictions that
have either completely abandoned the emergency rule or have heavily restricted
its use).
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discretion issue and provided the court with another option when
faced with inconsistent special verdicts in the future. Primary
assumption of risk was inapplicable to Daly and rightly remained
limited in its application, as intended by the Springrose definition.
The emergency rule was also inapplicable due to a lack of
suddenness and the fact that the “emergency” was brought on by
McFarland himself.
Despite being correct in its decision to apply neither primary
assumption of risk nor the emergency rule, the Minnesota
Supreme Court simply did not go far enough. The Daly case
provided the court with a unique opportunity to bring clarity to two
legal doctrines that have only provided confusion. Unfortunately,
the court chose to allow both doctrines to linger on.
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